No matter how many times we have used Abba Eban's remark about the Palestinians that "they never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity" it seems to be perennially applicable.
Once again, the Palestinians were very close to reaching their goal, yet at the last moment they couldn't resist the temptation to shoot themselves in the foot. Once you ignore the double-talk and the smoke screen surrounding Yasser Arafat's response to President Clinton's proposals, it seems that the Palestinians have done it again. Basically, the Palestinian leader said no to the most far-reaching deal any Israeli prime minister ever agreed to: handing over most of the West Bank and all of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinians; removal of great many Israeli settlements; a Palestinian state, with its capital in East Jerusalem and sovereignty over most of the Muslim and Christian holy sites. Arafat said no to all that.
Why? Because he didn't get what he wanted on one single issue: the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to the homes they had left in 1948.
Here is a quick historical reminder. In 1937, the Peel Commission of Inquiry set by the British to probe into the problem of Palestine recommended that the land be partitioned between Arabs and Jews. David Ben-Gurion, the ardent Zionist leader, said yes, thus relinquishing the Jewish claim over what every Jew believes to be a part of the biblical Land of Israel. The Arabs, on the other hand, rejected the plan and launched their Great Arab Revolt, which was crushed by the British. Ten years later, the United Nations passed a resolution calling again for the partition of Palestine. The Jews greeted the resolution, which offered them only a fraction of their homeland, with outbursts of joy. The Arabs responded by attacking the Jews. In May 1948, the armies of the surrounding Arab states joined in the attack, in the hope of wiping out the newborn State of Israel. Nothing of the sort happened, but in the course of the war, some 750,000 Palestinians left their homes and became refugees in the Arab countries. The Arabs, instead of settling their Palestinian brothers and sisters, kept them in refugee camps, dooming them to life poverty and helplessness.
Two decades passed until another wave of Arab aggression sparked the Six Day War, which ended with another defeat for the Arabs and with more Palestinian refugees. Israel, at the height of its victory, declared its willingness to trade the newly occupied territories for peace. The Arab leaders, convening in Khartoum, responded not with one No but with three: No recognition of Israel, No talks with Israel, No peace with Israel.
What have the Palestinians gained from this rejectionist approach? Nothing but more misery. Only when they entered into the peace process, did things start to work for them. Last July, however, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak told them what the Israeli red line was: Israel could not agree to the return of the Palestinian refugees into Israel proper. Why? Because it would mean the end of the Jewish State, and no Israeli Jew would say aye to such national suicide. Everything else, however, including Jerusalem, was open to discussion. Arafat said no. He wants everything.
What Arafat has managed to achieve for the Palestinians by his latest stroke of rejection is a growing awareness among Israelis that they don't really have a partner for peace. At least not for the time being. Mr. Arafat has exposed himself as a revolutionary leader who, at the moment of truth, lacks the courage to turn to his people and tell them the cruel facts of life, that this is probably the best deal they could hope for, and that they had better accept it. Instead, he once again humiliates Bill Clinton, who has invested enormous resources of time and energy and personal prestige in this process; he plays a dangerous game with the Israelis, by turning a blind eye or even encouraging acts of terror; and he once again commits the folly of turning for support to the Arab States, who have shown time and time again that their support of the Palestinians is always secondary to their own interests.
The Israeli response to Arafat's reckless game will be twofold. While most Israelis indicate in the recent polls that despite everything, they still support the peace process, they are probably going to replace Ehud Barak with Ariel Sharon as prime minister, trusting that he would handle Arafat's maneuvers better. If Arafat, in the back of his mind, believes that Israel has mellowed, and that another round of violence might bring it to its knees, he will soon have to deal with Ariel Sharon, the most ruthless general Israel has ever produced.
When the dust settles and the dead are buried, the Palestinians may look back and again regret the fact that they said no to a good offer. Another missed opportunity.
Uri Dromi is the publications director at the Israel democracy Institute in Jerusalem. This article was originally published in The Miami Herald on January 5, 2001.
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